See the Security Section, below and above, for more stories and features looking at the role of security at major events. In this feature, Tarique Ghaffur, takes an in-depth look at the Mumbia terrorist attacks.
Mumbai attacks will change city forever, as 7/7 did London
Mumbai's security response widely criticised
India can learn lessons from UK experiences
(Tarique Ghaffur is the former assistant commissioner of London's Metropolitan Police Service).
As the tragic events in Mumbai unfolded in the full gaze of the world's media in November 2008, there was a certain element of predictability around the sequence of responses from both within India and across the world.
The initial trauma and dismay at the ferocity and audacity of the attacks, evolved quickly into understandable anger and then into the inevitable politics of blame.
As the city returns to some semblance of ‘normality’, my thoughts returned to the events of 7th July 2005, the first time in London that we had experienced multiple and simultaneous home-grown terrorist attacks that were indiscriminate in nature and resulted in mass fatalities and casualties across all communities.
Those attacks changed London forever and brought about a new reality for everyone, just as the Mumbai attacks are likely to bring a new reality to the city and to India.
GLOBALISATION, TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME
We are currently living through an historic transition that is being fuelled by some dynamic processes of change: improved digital communications and information technologies increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalised economy.
Unfortunately, this process of globalisation also has a dark side: the expanding opportunities are just as attractive to the entrepreneurial spirit of criminal and terrorist groups as they are to the legitimate business world.
In this new global age, business is booming, but unfortunately so is international organised crime and terrorism.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the transformation of the international security environment in response to the terrorist threat has been preoccupying many governments.
However, it is equally important to note that while the focus remains firmly fixed on countering global terrorism, organised crime continues to flourish under the radar.
As the legitimate sources of money are being closed off, terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah, have involved themselves in an array of criminal enterprises, including drug sales, credit card fraud, armed robbery and the illicit sale of counterfeit cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, DVDs and other goods.
An estimated $12.5bn derived from drug trafficking from Morocco, was believed to have funded the 2004 Madrid rail bomb attack, along with other terrorist incidents.
As a consequence, I believe that the emerging synergy between globalisation, criminal networks and terrorism will undoubtedly become the marque of international policing and security in the 21st century.
Because of difficulties around penetration, limited information exists generally about global terrorist networks like al-Qaeda and estimates of network size are therefore extremely varied.
However, certain characteristics have become apparent from analysing the global experience:
- They have a ‘fuzzy’ organizational structure with only limited central oversight.
- They operate in small local independent tight-knit cells and are therefore difficult to penetrate.
- They are patient, working to long term goals based on a common cause.
- They are prepared to engage in indiscriminate multiple and simultaneous attacks to inflict mass fatalities and casualties using whatever means necessary, without concern for their own safety.
- This makes such groups extremely hard to track down and the consequences of their actions are often devastating, as we have seen in Mumbai.
There can be little doubt that here is ‘little-T’ globalisation has had a major impact on political and special interest terrorism.
Leading up to 2001, hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured in terrorist attacks, aimed predominantly against US military personnel and consular staff across the world, including Kenya, Beirut and the World Trade Centre in New York.
But it was the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on the 11th September 2001 that defined the new face of global terrorism that we have been experiencing, including the London, Madrid and Bali bombings.
As Peter Clarke, the former Head of the Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command, said, "The threat from terrorism is real. It is here, it is deadly and it is enduring”.
TERRORISM IN INDIA
Terrorism in India is diverse and stems from several direct causes: the country's various Maoist, socialist and Sikh separatist groups, and the continuing cycle of violence between Islamic militants and Hindu nationalist militants, particularly the territorial dispute over India-controlled Kashmir.
The key departure I can see in the November Mumbai attacks has been the primary targeting of wealthy or foreign people, especially wealthy Indians, Westerners and Jewish people, as opposed to the more common focus of Islamist terrorist attacks on public spaces, where the victims were predominantly Hindus.
India has undoubtedly experienced its own increase in the scale and frequency of terrorist attacks over the past decade, with more than 4,000 Indians dying in attacks since 2004 – the highest total of any other nation besides Iraq.
In the last year there have been attacks in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujurat, Argatala, Imphal and Assam, resulting in hundreds of deaths.
Mumbai itself was attacked in a series of bombings in 1993 that killed over 250 people, and again in the 2006 train bombings that killed over 180 people.
Each time, the "Mumbai spirit", enabled the city to brush itself down and resume its state of normality.
But this time, the situation appears to be different.
GETTING A SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE
There are many issues that will need to be considered in any review of the Mumbai attacks, but the issue of perspective cannot be ignored.
The challenge that faces the Indian authorities in preventing such assaults in the future is immense, not least because of the country’s size and social complexity.
In Mumbai, the city's population has doubled in 25 years creating a population of over 13m, and when combined with the neighbouring suburbs of Navi Mumbai and Thane, the total rises to around 19m, making it one of the most populous metropolitan areas in the world.
More than 60 percent of the city's population is believed to live in slums.
Dharavi, Asia's second largest slum is located in central Mumbai and houses over 1m people.
Therefore it would not be a difficult task for terrorists to achieve anonymity in the city.
Despite the perceived failings in the security response in Mumbai, the fact remains that this type of attack could have occurred in almost any city of the world.
10 men armed with weapons would kill a lot of people before a security intervention could be put into place.
Therefore, all large cities are vulnerable to attack; even if London doubled the size of its security resources, there is no way it could protect its hotels, hospitals, religious centres and railway stations from attacks of this type, short of turning them into armed fortresses.
In New York and Washington on 9/11, 19 men armed killed nearly 3,000 people.
The 2004 Madrid train bombings involved only a small number of perpetrators to killed 191 people, and in the 2005 bombings on London's Underground, just four terrorists killed 52 people.
Each of these attacks was low-tech, caused enormous psychological and economic damage in addition to loss of life, and each occurred in countries with sophisticated security forces.
It is against this perspective that I will now discuss the Mumbai attacks.
THE MUMBAI ATTACK
The speculation and commentary around the events that unfolded in Mumbai bbetween the 26th and 29th November was immense.
It is not my intention to critique that coverage here, but simply to elicit some basic, commonly agreed facts and identify the key challenges.
It would appear that at least 10 suspects entered Mumbai from the coast after hijacking a fishing boat and then carried out their plan to shoot and kill wealthy Indians, Westerners and Jewish people at a number of locations, including two luxury hotels, a rail terminal, a hospital, a popular restaurant and a Jewish centre.
The orchestrated nature of the attacks suggests a well-planned, well equipped operation, including sophisticated communications, carried out by well-trained individuals.
While an apparently previously unknown group, Deccan Mujahedeen, have claimed responsibility for the attacks, the general speculation based on the alleged confession of the captured suspect, is that the Mumbai suspects were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani-based jihadist organisation with alleged ties to al Qaeda.
The number of suspects involved has been collated from the nine that were killed and the one suspect that was detained.
However, it is possible that other terrorists may still be alive and highly likely that other people were involved in the planning and preparation of an operation of this nature.
Interestingly, there is speculation that the essential local logistical support network was provided by the most notorious Mumbai mafia gang, D Company, which is run by Dawood Ibrahim, an organised-crime boss who is widely believed to also have links with al-Qaeda.
THE SECURITY RESPONSE
The collective security response to the attacks in Mumbai, at both the local and national government level, seems to have attracted a great deal of criticism, particularly the lack of any clear counter terrorism strategy, the under-funded and inefficient intelligence services and the security service response to the attacks.
In particular, there has been a great deal of focus on the ‘politicisation of terror,’ and with elections only six months away, the pressure on the government appears to be acute.
Many observers see a pattern of both government and opposition politicians reflexively seeking scapegoats, externalising the threat and making excuses.
The events in Mumbai have already resulted in the resignation of the country's Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, and the chief minister and deputy chief minister of Maharashtra.
At the same time, the Mumbai attacks have led to an escalation in tensions with Pakistan.
It is at such times of crisis that the political parties need to rise above narrow political considerations and work collaboratively to tackle the international and domestic threats of terrorism.
COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY
In relation to the counter terrorism strategy, the Indian media have reported widespread concerns that despite the unprecedented number of terrorist attacks, the events in Mumbai have further highlighted the ongoing failure to develop a coherent national strategy and credible action plan.
This has resulted in calls for a major reform of the country’s security architecture and a need to engage with the international counter terrorism community.
The globalisation of crime and terrorism has now produced a very real security threat that is growing.
To counter this threat, the UK has developed a long-term Counter-Terrorism Strategy known as CONTEST.
The focus of CONTEST over the next 5 years is about reducing the risk, by reducing the threat and our vulnerability.
To achieve this, there are four key strands, to: - PURSUE terrorists and those that sponsor them;
- PROTECT the public and UK interests;
- PREPARE for the consequences;
- PREVENT terrorism by tackling its underlying causes;
This is a very clear security strategy that requires focused and sustained collaborative effort across all four stands from a broad range of agencies.
INTELLIGENCE ISSUES
In order to pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them, and protect the public and India’s interests, it is vital that the intelligence processes are working effectively.
However, there appears to be a growing consensus that the events in Mumbai merely highlight the significant challenges faced by the Indian intelligence services.
Issues raised include poor intelligence-gathering systems, poor coordination and inefficient information-sharing between the various intelligence agencies, under-funding and poor resourcing, difficulties around interception and a dearth of language specialists.
It would appear that at least 10 suspects entered Mumbai from the sea, along with an extensive arsenal of weapons, ammunition and grenades.
Did anyone witness any part of this process and recognise the potential threat or was the first awareness of this threat by security resources on the ground when the attacks took place?
There is a picture emerging of various prior warnings about these attacks.
As far back as 2007, it is alleged that a report was prepared for the Indian Parliament that India's shores could be used to launch terrorist assaults on the country.
Indian intelligence agencies are now suggesting that they gave about half a dozen warnings to the government in Maharashtra state that strikes were being planned on city landmarks, including, possibly, the Taj Mahal hotel.
A captured Lashkar-e-Taiba operative apparently told Indian interrogators months ago that he had carried out reconnaissance of both the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels.
The head of an Indian fishermens' union also stated that he had warned the government that militants were using sea routes to smuggle explosives four months ago.
The agencies have also appeared to have been picking up militant chatter on attacks in the city.
Perhaps more alarming is the fact that a US official told the Associated Press nn Tuesday 25th November that the Indian authorities had been told of an apparent plot to launch an attack on Mumbai from the sea.
The information gathered was specific enough to cite threats to Mumbai's main hotels, and the possibility that Islamic militants might use boats to penetrate the city's weak coastal defences.
ABC News also quoted Indian officials as saying that after receiving the US warning, they also intercepted a satellite phone message on 18th November warning of a seaborne attack on Mumbai.
Any subsequent inquiry should identify the true extent of any intelligence failings in relation to the Mumbai attacks, particularly around the advanced warnings, and identify areas for improvement.
However, the real intelligence world is not always as clear cut as it may have been portrayed.
One of the problems is that the various Indian intelligence agencies may have received so many warnings that did not come to anything that they grew complacent about taking any of them seriously.
However, the fact remains that intelligence is the lifeblood of security, whether it is in the pursuit of terrorists or in preventing their activity.
While there are technical ways of gathering information, the principal sources will always come from the alertness of people living and working in communities.
This requires a huge investment in developing community policing and the secure intelligence systems necessary to gain the confidence and reassurance of such communities.
Ultimately, you do not have an intelligence system if people are not confident enough to provide information and there are not secure analytical processes in place to turn information into intelligence.
Ultimately, information has little real value unless it is properly analysed, disseminated and acted upon.
CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY
Beyond intelligence, it is important to have strong capacity and capability, i.e. sufficient numbers of properly trained and equipped security resources.
I am led to understand that there are nearly half a million armed state police officers and half a million "home guards" in the country, as well as more than 200,000 "central reserve police" responsible for internal security.
The Central Bureau of Investigations, the federal law agency, and the Intelligence Bureau also employ tens of thousands.
Yet the current ratio of officers to population is around only 122 officers for every 100,000 people, which is considerably lower than many other countries.
More seriously, the Indian police appear to be incapacitated by a lack of money and training.
A recent report by a national police research agency showed that the annual training budget for policemen in some states worked out at around 100 rupees (two dollars) per head.
Poor working conditions, rudimentary surveillance and communications equipment, inadequate forensic science laboratories and outdated weaponry are making matters worse.
For instance, ordinary policemen have been apparently issued with ancient single-bolt Lee-Enfield .303 rifles, which they have typically fired 10 times total during training.
Poorly trained and equipped security resources will always be at a disadvantage when faced with with well trained and equipped terorrists, determined to engage in indiscriminate multiple and simultaneous attacks to inflict mass fatalities and casualties using whatever means necessary, without concern for their own safety.
Analysts have also noted weaknesses in maritime security and the lack of coordination among the different security agencies.
Despite the approach to the city by sea and the merging intelligence picture of this threat, the terrorists passed through a crowded fishing colony either unnoticed or without any challenge.
The Coast Guard, the primary agency responsible for guarding the coastline, appears to have similar challenges around personnel and infrastructure to do its job.
The Mumbai Coast Guard seems to have only a handful of patrol boats, and lacks state-of-the-art radar, surveillance equipment and speedboats.
The use of coastal route by terrorists to pass undetected into Mumbai has exposed the vulnerability of the country’s coastline.
However, no border of a nation the size of India will ever be entirely secure from routine security measures.
The maritime border alone stretches for some 7,516 kilometres with 12 major and 180 minor ports.
That is why when you get specific intelligence about a threat in a specific area it must to be actioned in an appropriate and sustained manner.
THE ATTACKS
Once the suspects had breached the coastal security, they then passed apparently unnoticed into the city and split into a number of groups to attack around 10 specific locations.
Two groups entered the Oberoi-Trident and Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotels and proceeded to kill indiscriminately over a 60-hour period.
The figures around the death toll are still fluctuating, but it is believed that at least 188 people were killed during the sustained attacks, including around 28 foreigners and 30 security personnel, and a further 200 people were injured.
This tragic loss of life in such numbers will undoubtedly have a massive impact within the close-knit affluent community of Mumbai.
The two iconic Mumbai hotels bore much of the brunt of the attacks and they highlight the extent of the planning that went into this terrorist action.
Despite the sheer size of the hotel, with 565 rooms, dozens of hallways and many hiding places, the terrorists inside the Taj Hotel appeared to have detailed inside knowledge about both the public and private areas of the premises.
This would have required considerable insider information, possibly though employment in the hotel, detailed planning and preparation over a period of time.
Conversely, the security forces did not appear to have plans for any of the buildings they were searching.
The very nature of the hotel business demands openness and accessibility for visitors and guests, making them a soft and attractive target to terrorists, as highlighted in the recent attacks on hotels in Pakistan, Jordan and Afghanistan.
The public relations damage of attacking a symbol of national pride like the Taj Mahal Palace makes it even more attractive to terrorists.
Apparently, security at the Taj Hotel had been stepped up after a credible threat had been made against it in September, but this was relaxed just two days before the terrorist strike.
However, this would not have prevented the terrorists from affecting their entry into the hotel.
DEALING WITH CRITICAL INCIDENTS
The quality of the initial response is absolutely vital in dealing with major critical incidents.
The initial response in the Mumbai attacks was certainly challenging in many respects and there appears to be many areas for learning and improvement.
In London, the initial and subsequent responses to major incidents are now governed by legislation under the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act.
This Act sets out a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level.
Such emergencies could include a flu pandemic, a major flooding or where there is a threat to security – such as the terrorist acts experienced on 7/7.
As a designated first responder, the police are subject to the full set of civil protection duties.
Within London, the Strategic Emergency Plan provides a blueprint for the collaborative handling of any disruptive incident in the Capital and contains the key plans on which London's resilience is based - for example the Command and Control Protocol, the Communication Protocol, the Mass Fatalities plan, the large-scale evacuation framework and the Site Clearance plan.
There is a clear strategy based on 4 key stages: - To work with the emergency services to preserve life and deal with any casualties;
- Take steps to preserve evidence and where relevant to arrest offenders;
- Take steps to reassure all communities and businesses of London;
- To return London to normality.
A formal body known as the London Regional Resilience Forum has been set up to provide full time overseeing of the plans, progress and meetings for the London region.
This may be an approach that India needs to consider in its review of what happened.
The initial response of the Mumbai's security forces to the attacks came under significant media scrutiny, being variously described as slow, inefficient, ill-equipped and woefully unprepared to handle the threat.
Mumbai also does not have a tactical firearms response equivalent to a SWAT team and therefore the initial response fell to local security resources.
One of the first actions when critical incidents occur is to secure the area and provide a security exclusion zone through armed and unarmed cordons, as appropriate.
This provides the first visible representation that the security forces have taken control of the scene.
It is my understanding that cordoning off the respective scenes took considerable time to put in place, if it ever went in effectively.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The simultaneous emergence of seven or eight incidents would create massive command and control challenges for any police force, so I can appreciate the challenges faced by the commanders on the ground in Mumbai.
In the UK we use the Gold, Silver and Bronze system of command and control.
This provides a consistent approach to setting the strategy, determining tactics and undertaking the operational delivery.
Under this system, the Gold Commander is in overall control of the whole critical situation.
They will not be at the scene, but at a distant control room, known as Gold Command, where they will formulate the strategy for dealing with the incident(s).
The Silver Commander is the tactical commander who manages the strategic direction from Gold and converts this into sets of actions that are completed by Bronzes.
They are not usually located at the scene as they need to be able to take a step back and review all the different operational requirements.
A Bronze Commander directly controls the resources at each incident and will be found with their staff working at the scene.
If an incident is widespread geographically, different Bronzes would normally assume responsibility for specific locations and even functions.
An effective communications system overlays the structure to ensure that the Gold, Silver and Bronzes are kept well informed.
It is a great tragedy that the three top anti-terrorism officials in Mumbai chose to attend the scenes immediately when the violence began and paid the ultimate price with their lives as they were gunned down.
Despite their bravery, the fact that the three top officials drove in the same vehicle to the scene strongly suggests that there was little or no concept of command and control in place at that time.
Their tragic loss would have further damaged the command and control of the initial security response to the attacks.
THE GOLDEN HOUR
It is a fairly universally accepted principle that there is a critical ‘golden hour’ where operational responses need to be quick and decisive.
The longer it takes for decisive action to be taken, the greater the risk to life and property.
In the case of the Mumbai attacks, the elite 7,400-strong National Security Guards (NSG) commandos based in New Delhi took around 8 hours to be deployed in Mumbai.
This gave the terrorists considerable time to effect their purpose by killing innocent people and establish strong defensive positions.
This crucial delay has been widely discussed in the media, but can be summarised as a delay in authorising their deployment, no immediate military air transport available, the lack of authority to requisition a commercial plane, a long flight and then transfer by bus as no helicopters were available.
There were also suggestions that the NSG commandos have only been trained to rescue small groups of people and therefore had little experience in dealing with multiple location operations of such scale.
Once deployed, the NSG commandos had to operate in extremely difficult circumstances, hampered by the lacked of an effective command structure or a good communication system.
The use of military security resources during terrorist attacks needs to be considered carefully.
In the UK, the police will always provide the first security response and are tactically driven within a `tight command and control structure.
Military resources do not provide an overt response alongside the police because their deployment immediately escalates the risk that the situation will be construed as a ‘war zone'.
If the Indian police do not currently have this capability, then careful consideration needs to be given to making this happen.
DEALING WITH THE MEDIA
It was also very noticeable that various military officials were involved in speaking to the media at various times.
A major terrorist attack that perpetrated on Mumbai will undoubtedly attract the full blaze of global media with continuous breaking news.
The degree to which the media are permitted access to critical incident scenes has been a matter of much debate in the UK.
There is clearly a desire on the part of the media to get footage, but this must not be allowed to compromise the operational imperatives.
Given the sophistication of the communications available to the terrorists, they would have potentially been given them an advantage of being able to monitor security force movements that would not otherwise have been available without such free media access.
Also, where a multitude of officials are speaking to the press, this has the potential to exacerbate the confusion.
It is therefore vitally important that the media are provided with a press point where they are addressed by a single spokesperson for consistency of message.
THE AFTERMATH
In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the focus will now have shifted to evidence gathering, providing reassurance to Mumbai’s communities and businesses and returning the city to its new ‘normality’.
Evidence-gathering across multiple large scenes will undoubtedly be protracted and there will potentially be both physical and technological evidence that could be recovered for analysis.
Unfortunately, there is an absence of a comprehensive mix of public and private CCTV in Mumbai, as there is in most world cities.
CCTV proved crucial in understanding the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, particularly in tracking down the suspects for the failed bombings on the 21st July.
In terms of reassurance, there will undoubtedly have been an increased police presence on the city's streets.
There have also been a number of political promises to boost up the security effort, including a local government announcement that it would set up a state commando force of some 500 armed men that would be ready in four months.
This could be a challenging goal when the basic training for the NSG commandos takes six months and Maharashtra, along with other states, has no commando training centre.
The Indian government has also stated that it will double the size of the 7,400-strong National Security Guard commando and place them in four more areas across the country.
It has also claimed to be framing laws to set up a federal investigative agency to streamline the work of state and national agencies.
I have also noted that major hotels have also scaled up their security in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks.
These have included increasing overt and covert guarding, bringing in x-ray machines and metal detectors at entrances, body frisking and even establishing barricades at entrance and exit gates.
However, while the immediate efforts to improve the security in the aftermath of the attacks are necessary as an initial reaction, and while the political promises for significantly increasing security resources in the future are laudable, I cannot get away from the fact that there is a fundamental need to re-think security.
TOWARDS NEW THINKING
What global terrorism has been able to demonstrate in the past few years is that it is unrealistic to believe that all security efforts will deny every attack every time.
Therefore the most pragmatic approach is to seek to protect cities as far as possible, by minimising safety and security threats, vulnerabilities and risks.
In the event of any incident, the mission is then to respond effectively, rapidly and proportionately, to minimise the impact and to deal with the consequences.
This was the approach that I took to developing the Security Strategy for the 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Games in London.
The security challenge is to protect London over the 90 or so days of the Games from a broad range of threats, including terrorist attacks.
On carefully analysing the issues and risks, it became quickly apparent to me that adopting a conventional approach to safety and security could ultimately prove inadequate.
As a consequence I developed a much more holistic end-to-end approach to safety and security, involving some new thinking, particularly around different security footprints.
Subsequent to devising the Olympic Security Strategy, I have been working hard on significantly developing this whole approach to a new level, in order to provide a holistic safety and security model for any global city.
This model in turn can be utilised to provide a holistic safety and security approach to individual elements such as critical infrastructure, aviation, maritime and land transportation, spectator venues, public spaces, commercial districts, down to individual buildings, including hotels and shopping malls.
The safety and security principles applied are the same irrespective of the scale.
Safety and security is a neutral agenda for everyone.
Nearly 300 people died during the Mumbai attacks; the compound tragedy to families, friends, school and work colleagues, as well as the wider city and countries from which they came is massive.
However, their deaths must not simply fade into history; they require a legacy.
That legacy must be an overarching commitment at every level in India to defeat terrorism and crime together.
The tragic events in Mumbai have convinced me more than ever that a new approach to our thinking around safety and security is absolutely essential.
Furthermore, I am sure that the holistic end-to-end approach to safety and security is the way forward.
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